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Social innovation aims for creating social value primarily while it recognizes that not all
technology-based progress amounts to social progress. We think that this calls for a
paradigm shift in how we understand education. No one doubts that education requires
intense cognitive effort, but educational proposals certainly vary depending on how
cognition is understood. In this article, we suggest that different ways of understanding
human development are related to different ways of understanding cognition. Thus, these
different conceptions of human development affect their resulting educational proposal.
While not an exhaustive account, we sketch out three models of human development,
the so-called autonomous self (AS), processual self (PS), and inter-processual self (IPS).
Each has different implications for education depending on their particular understanding
of cognition. The AS and PS models understand cognition as a primarily rational
mastery exercise, with the difference that PS uses relationships and diverse psychological
faculties for the subject’s cognitive development, whereas AS relies more on the subject’s
rational agency. On the other hand, IPS understands cognition as a relational act that,
when it arises from interiority, affects all dimensions of the person. In the present article,
we explore the educational consequences of these different ways of understanding
cognition with the assistance of interdisciplinary dialogue from philosophy, psychology,
and neuroscience, and their repercussion on social innovation with the intention of
opening up reflection in the field of education and of inspiring its practitioners to
rethink the model they assume. We will conclude with reflections informing educational
implications for the design of programs and teacher training itself.
Keywords: cognition, human development, educational models, inter-processual self, innovation
INTRODUCTION
The concept of “social innovation” has primarily emerged from humanities and social sciences
scholars rather than from literature and debates on innovation within economics; consequentially,
not all innovation theory scholars from economics agree that it captures a conceptual aspect that
differs from (any other sort of) innovation (Pol and Ville, 2009). However, theorists from social
economics and from the social sciences and humanities suggest that it is a distinct concept and
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captures important pro-social motivations toward offering social
value and growth (Pol and Ville, 2009)1.
Existing definitions coincide in that they stress that, insofar
as innovation is conducive to enhancing human welfare, it is
social and distinct from other forms thereof (Pol and Ville, 2009).
Hence, social innovation intends to innovate such that social
needs are met (Moulaert et al., 2005, p. 1976). Historically, social
innovation arose from the fact that technological innovation
through competition does not guarantee social development and
can even be counterproductive to it (Meadows, 1972). Of note,
society is here understood as an agent, not as a sum of individuals
and education is recognized as one of social innovation’s most
important fields of action (Moulaert et al., 2005, p. 1970).
We argue that the concept of social innovation can aid our
understanding of education. By starting with an educational
model focused on competition, we reproduce errors that
necessitated social innovation in the first place. In the same
way that technological development does not in itself imply
truly sustainable improvement of society, teaching to skills does
not in itself mean developing an education in the service of
society. Education studies have indicated that solely focusing
on the development of skills can be counterproductive (Delors
et al., 1996, pp. 16–18). In this sense, the concerns found in
the literature on social innovation coincide with those of Delors,
whose goal for education is learning to live together. The latter
focus may even feed into social inequalities.
We need another way of understanding education since
innovation in education cannot merely focus on increasing
efficiency and effectiveness when it comes to skill acquisition.
For that, we must employ a social understanding of education
from the very beginning. This article thus proposes a social
model of human development called the “inter-processual self ”
(Akrivou et al., 2018) and applies it to education “centered
on the interpersonal relationship” (Orón Semper and Blasco,
2018). It further provides an adequate conceptual framework
for education in service of social innovation, suggesting that
education that does not have a social foundation will not
successfully integrate social aspects later.
Since social innovation is highly interdisciplinary (Mulgan,
2012) and this issue focuses on education, we have reviewed
the basics of cognition and human development as they relate
to education in dialogue with philosophy, psychology, and
neuroscience. Thus, we arrive at an educational model that is
coherent with social innovation.
Every educational proposal is based on various theoretical
assumptions, which naturally come from other disciplines that
serve as the source for a conceptual framework. In particular,
Abbreviations: AS, Autonomous Self; PS, Processual Self; IPS, Inter-Processual
Self.
1While it goes beyond the scope of this article, it is worth mentioning that,
within the scholarly debate on definitions of social innovation, many authors
focus on new idea generation that, according to Heiskala (2007), constitute “social
innovation” insofar as they bring about “change in at least one of . . . three social
structures: cultural, normative and regulative.” Pol and Ville (2009) have criticized
this definition as too broad. Upon reviewing the literature, they believe that social
innovation exists if the novel idea(s) involved can potentially improve quality or
quantity of life.
the natural sources for education are psychology and philosophy
because one’s view of the person and her development structures
the resulting educational proposal. Obviously, this does not
resolve the work of education; rather, as an autonomous
discipline, it has its own field of study. A new source of influence
on the field of education materialized with neuroscientific
developments at the beginning of the twenty first century,
providing a contrast to verify if certain pedagogical dispositions
are congruent or not with neuroscientific discoveries. In the
present article, we go into a theoretical discussion centered on
the person and her development. To do this, we put philosophy,
psychology, and neuroscience in dialogue with the intention of
opening up reflection in the field of education and of inspiring its
practitioners to rethink the model they assume.
Since organizational education has been well-defined as a field
of study (Göhlich et al., 2018), it has been acknowledged that
educational such as the school and the university (and broader
organizations), in order to learn and to influence learning in
society, must be protagonists within the wider learning context
through cooperative practices at micro, meso, and macro levels.
Hence, a main research concern in organizational education
is ways in which learning in (educational) organizations can
be understood and explored. Within this context, there is an
interesting stream of research in organizational education that
aims to share data and build theory on how best social value,
learning, and innovation ensue from educational programs that
develop relations and networks of exchange within their wider
community as a distinct strategy for social innovation (for
example, Grogan and Fahrenwald, 2019 in Weber et al., 2019).
In previous research (Akrivou and Orón, 2016; Akrivou
et al., 2018), we have identified two major competitive lines
in human development today, the so-called Autonomous Self
(AS) and the Inter-processual Self (IPS); now, we intend to
show their influence on education. Our aim is to contribute
on the organizational education stream of work concerned
with how to elevate educational relations to positively influence
learning and growth involving wider forms of community and
“polis” (the superordinate socio-political organizations wherein
schools and educational institutions are situated). The focus of
our contribution is to share new theory on these contrasting
educational paradigms (AS and PS—which is a sub-category
of AS—vs. IPS), which allows us to reflect on how their
conflicting or incommensurable anthropological approaches
(“mindsets”) regarding the self and action involving relations are
understood, and to derive educational implications to be utilized
in the context of designing different learning interventions and
informing teacher training too.
Our published work introducing these incommensurable
paradigms of self and action has been inspired by the neo-
Aristotelian Spanish philosopher Polo (2012, p. 281), who
synthesized the key ontological concerns in the history of
philosophy regarding being human and proposed the following
three main fundamental roots that inform what is involved in
being human throughout different philosophical and historical
systems of thought: (1) A rootedness in “nature,” which captures
the classical philosophy and Aristotle’s basic proposal (that we are
constituted by our shared and distinct biological, cultural, and
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traditional sources); (2) the rootedness in the modern “subject-
agent” fundamental, which expresses modernity’s emphasis on
the human drive to create novelty and to succeed in its
mastery over the wider human and non-human environment
via rationalistic agency, with a focus on results; and (3) the
predicament involved in the fundamental of “personhood” (or
Christian fundamental root of human civilization); this latter
emphasizes personal singularity and uniqueness as well as that
at the heart of being and growing as a human being. Accordingly,
we characterize the AS paradigm on the self and action as the
mindset that comprises the different modern and post-modern
proposals on the self and action. This model (AS) conceives
human growth as a result of individual productive activity aiming
to dominate and “master” the environment as a focal object,
according to the wishes of the actors-subjects. The PS model is
presented as a variation or maturation of the AS model because it
gives value to relationships; however, in this mindset, relation is
understood in a rather instrumental fashion, i.e., a relation with
another person or a community or a network is seen as a focal
object and just like in AS the aim is to master the object according
to the wishes of the actors-subjects.
Conversely, we suggested that IPS is an integrative mindset,
uniting Polo’s “personhood” with the classical root of “nature”
and themodern approach of the “subject-agent.”Who we are and
how action is understood from within IPS involve an ontology
of relation from the very constitution of our being. Accordingly,
in IPS, growth is not understood as success via mastery, but
it is understood as the “intensification of the relationships that
constitute the human person in what she fundamentally is.”
Depending on which of these two corresponding paradigms—
AS/PS or IPS—is taken as a point of departure to characterize the
person, there will be different ways of understanding cognition
and education (Akrivou et al., 2016).
This classification can be enriched thanks to the current
neuroscientific debate, led by Kahneman (2011), who presents
two brain systems that are related to various psychological
processes: system 1—also called rapid system—which results on
a more emotional character, and system 2—also called slow
system—which is more cognitive. He maintained that many
human mistakes are a result of system 1 being decisive in
decision-making, whereas more accurate answers are given when
decisions are made from system 2. From this, we hypothesize
that the AS model corresponds to a person acting according
to system 2, the PS as a synthesis of models 1 and 2; and the
IPS does not enter into this way of understanding decision-
making (and its related way of approaching cognition) but rather
in a different form of understanding the most dynamic and
systemic cerebral operation that does not admit this association
of cerebral modules to psychological processes. As a result, the
PS is presented as a superior stage to the AS—an integration of
systems 2 and 1, but IPS does not respond to this classification.
We suggest that new research introducing the IPS (Akrivou
and Orón, 2016; Akrivou et al., 2018) critically argues that
who/what we really are as humans involves being and growing
as an integrated person, which requires integrating the three
aforementioned fundamentals that are cross-culturally important
for understanding the self, human action, and meaning, in
other words, human nature, each personal and singular reality,
and the capacity to produce new realities. The IPS proposal
is related to another way of understanding the brain and
mental functioning that pressuposes a systemic and dynamic
approach (Kelso, 1995; Sporns, 2011, 2014; Pessoa, 2013;
Anderson, 2014). According to this systemic and dynamic view,
by synchronic processes, the whole brain is unified in each
mental action, and the modular vision that relates brain modules
with psychological functions has already been put in relation
with the different ways of understanding emotional education
(Orón et al., 2016). This opens a wider hypothesis that relates
the three models of self-development (AS, PS, and IPS) with
different neuropsychological models (dynamic and modular).
This relationship between different understandings of the self and
neuropsychological models will strengthen the conceptualization
offered, allowing us to better conceptualize the different ways
of understanding cognition and its subsequent application to
pedagogical reflection, and social innovation.
In this article, we will proceed as follows: first we will introduce
the AS, PS, and IPS models in relation to our topic. Then, we
will relate these contrasting paradigms to different proposals that
arise from research in neuropsychology and then we shall relate
these to inform and reflect on how each influences how networks
and educational relations with wider social communities may
be understood.
THE MODERN PERSPECTIVE
UNDERLYING THE AS AND PS MINDSET
The two contrasting proposals regarding the “mindset”
assumptions on the self and action that characterize the
AS/PS proposal and the IPS naturally express two distinct
conceptualizations regarding action with moral maturity and
how the self relates to others in any action. The AS and the effort
to overcome AS’s limitation through a transition to a PS capture
a modernist approach relating human cognition and congruent
action with maturity. The difference between AS and PS lies
mainly in their view of cognition, which once explained will also
allow us to understand why IPS is a revolutionary approach.
Behind the AS and PS cognition is the idea that cognition
(mental models) drives action, which is also influenced by the
individual-context interaction (Blasi, 1980, 1983; Trevino, 1986;
Jones, 1991; Aquino and Reed, 2002). For example in descriptive
individual factors that drive persons to act ethically in the face of
various ethical and performance challenges, themain assumption
is that the stronger a person’s cognitive capacity regarding the
domains of moral awareness and meaning making (Aquino and
Reed, 2002), the higher the individual’s capacity to act effectively
facing moral dilemmas in the real world (for example, in
Kohlberg, 1969 and in Murphy and Gilligan, 1980). So action (in
this case, ethical action is seen as a domain of individual behavior)
is understood as driven by individual cognitive growth that is
rooted in the Piagetian human development stage hypothesis
(Piaget, 1962).
This assumption shapes the understanding of wider human
development theory regarding action with maturity in broader
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life domains; hence, different models have been proposed on
the same assumptions that understand individual action with
maturity facing intellectual and social challenges in the world
under a uni-linear stage hypothesis, for example, different post-
Piagetian stage theories of human development (such as Harvey
et al., 1961; Flavell, 1963; Loevinger, 1966, 1976; Perry, 1970;
Kegan, 1982, 1994; Lahey Laskow, 1986). Such theories share
a common biologically based assumption rooted in Werner’s
(1948) orthogenic principle (Johnson, 2000), which suggests that
action under the human developmental “modern” paradigm is
an idealized upwards progression movement following a notion
of stages when temporarily equilibrium has been reached; this
is marked by an increasing degree of cognitive complexity. So,
equilibria are expressed in terms of specific cognitive stages. Each
hypothesized equilibrium motivating cycle of action is fueled by
a certain quality and dynamics of cognitive (and moral) maturity
(Akrivou, 2008). Increases in cognitive complexity are thought
to enable motivational mechanisms in the self to synthesize
complexity, which is thought to allow the progression toward the
highest levels of hierarchical growth where in all these theories is
the only moment possible for human action to be characterized
by integrity. Integrity is seen as a concern to respond ethically
to the social world without only one’s own interest resolution
in mind2.
A key assumption of all the modern paradigm on the self and
action with integrity vis-à-vis the social world is the idea that
individual autonomous cognitive development lies at the basis
of development until about the end where the concerns of the
subject-agent is basically how to succeed in forms of tactical and
strategic action, which allow the mastery of the object world. The
same authors however recognize their very key assumption as a
weak hypothesis at a late stage of development in their models,
when a dualistic switch is proposed to a more intuitive, dynamic,
and adaptive kind of action that does not follow a cognitive rule
but is mainly about reacting effectively to external stimuli. This
is the PS proposal that, however, does not substantially overcome
the assumptions and limitations of the AS (main model) as it is
still mainly concerned about how the subject can lead successful
autonomous “authorship” via cognitive mastery of the object
world. The only difference here is that action is mainly through
dialectical relational responses, whereby relations and the object
world at large are being used as means for the acting subject’s own
cognitive growth via a more open, fluid, and dynamic response
capacity. In this version of the AS (i.e., the PS), the ethical
dimension of action disappears as a key concern behind action,
which is replaced by the ideal of freedom of the autonomous
2This assumption supporting a uni-linear cognitive stage type of development has
received criticism (Hannah et al., 2011). One of these critics highlights that the
origins of behavior associated with the human organism’s capacity to maintain
integrity have not been sufficiently explained (Bandura, 1991). Others point to the
empirical finding that the so-called “higher cognitive moral capacities” have only
been found in 10% of the overall population that performs moral reasoning at the
highest (the so-called post-conventional) levels of cognitive moral maturity in the
self (Kegan, 1994; Cook-Greuter, 1999). Finally, a third line critically reviewing
these theories notes that the modern assumption in all these modern theories
that inner moral cognitive maturity capacity predicts moral behavior has found
weak evidence based on empirical data (Ford and Richardson, 1994; O’Fallon and
Butterfield, 2005; Treviño et al., 2006).
will at the base of the PS proposal. However different these
two models—which we summarized as the AS and the (post-
autonomous) processual self (PS)—have been, they have quite
congruent basic assumptions; hence, PS in the majority of models
appears as the end stage following the highest forms of action
characterized by AS.
We suggest that, across AS and PS models in different
lines of work in modern psychology and human development
models, there are the same key premises as the anthropological
assumptions driving their notion of self and action. To show
the commonalities involved in how AS and PS are theorized,
we utilize social cognition theory to summarize the cognitive
dynamics of the AS and the PS. We show that AS theoretically
relies on the mastery of a critical, detached, and rationalist
knowledge and is comfortable with system 2 (“slow”) analytical
cognitive processing. Its moral psychology requires reason to
operate cleanly and detached from (moral) feelings. By contrast,
PS relies on a synthesis between system 1 (“fast”) and system
2 (“slow”), and this (Kahneman, 2011) requires PS to rely
more heavily on moral intuition and adaptive (more relationist)
cognitive processing responses as dominant modes of actions.
However, in PS, rationalist processing is secondary, and often
serves post-hoc rationalization of intuitive responses that do
not ultimately overcome self-autonomy. PS’s moral psychology
is attuned to inner focusing; it applies moral relativism and
relationism while it is adaptive to context3. For some authors
(for example, in the stage literature of adult development), PS
is often a negation or disavowal of AS. Other authors, however,
accept some kind of dualistic coexistence or a synthesis between
AS and PS; trying to “correct” AS makes these authors fall
into a dualism, accepting both modes without a clear rationale
of how their opposing assumptions can be combined. We
suggest that the limitations of AS and PS are based on their
assumptions surrounding self-autonomy and a modular view of
the brain (for greater clarity on the contrast between AS and PS,
see Table 1).
It should be noted that regarding the conflicting
cognitive preference bases distinguishing AS (relying on
abstract/rationalist) and PS (relying on a cognitive functioning
more akin to intuitive and emotional basis in cognition), AS does
not mean a lack of emotion or intuitive functioning, but rather a
preference for rationalism in the face of choices and dilemmas
related to action (Haidt, 2001). Both admit the presence of
rationalism and its influence, but, in the end, decision-making
in AS is based on rationalist cognition and that in PS is based on
intuitive and emotive cognitive preference. A summary of the
most important authors and models will help us to highlight the
links between AS and PS and the idea that they share the main
premises (for a comparison on the evolution between AS and PS
in moral development, see Table 2):
3In the literature of reference, we have found that the same authors that propose
AS as an idealized path for the self and human development in earlier adult life
subsequently propose PS in later stages. This is because, although all dominant
modern self- models in psychology contain fundamental assumptions that are
premised on a universal idealization of self-autonomy, their limitations as an ideal
for human action and growth are acknowledged.
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TABLE 1 | Two ways of knowing: two kinds of integrity based on the
self-autonomy paradigm.
AS (autonomous self) Integrity
and meaning making
PS (post-autonomous
processual self) Integrity and
meaning making
1. Believes in the capacity to align
behavior with one’s values,
principles, and beliefs
Responds to the reality as it
emerges via ongoing processual
adaptation and flow
2. Pursues ideals and principles in
alignment with a moral superior rule
(e.g., human rights, duties, justice,
acting with concern for others)
In all roles and relationships is
able to be authentic and express
feelings genuinely
3. Trusts and effectively applies a
decision process based on
analytical rationalist thinking to
analyze “hard facts” aiming to reach
“objectively” ethical decisions and
outcomes
Trusts and effectively applies
decision processes acting on
what “feels right” facing a certain
particular in a given moment and
time
4. Is principled; commits to the
importance of fair universal rules
and duties externally given and
wants explicit, clear, common and
normative frameworks with which
autonomous agents can align their
behavior
In all roles and relationships, one
authentically expresses feelings
as they appear at a given
moment
5. Devoted to a view of integrity based
on specific sets of values,
principles, commitments, and
duties
Approaches integrity as an
emergent natural process that
can be maintained subjectively
via “decentered subjectivity”
6. Believes a person must maintain
high-level ethical ideals and a
principled character to maintain
integrity
Values autonomous authorship
of one’s life story as important,
creative and authentic action in
the world
7. Is committed to maintaining a
principled character in accordance
with an externally valued moral
universal framework, without
questioning it
Is committed to acting
autonomously as it feels right in
any given moment as action that
makes the world a better place
based on the subject’s beliefs
8. Resolves conflicts of interests by
autonomously applying principles
and perceived duties according to
each agent, to reach an “ideal state
of affairs” in accordance with a
given moral framework. Negotiates
on the basis of social contract
principles
Trusts others to relate, talk and
respond directly; seeks
consensus via direct
subject–object relationships.
Negotiates via mutual
adjustment on the basis of
dialectics that invite bargaining
and/or synthesis of approaches
9. Is willing to question previous
stances, choices and actions only
after the conclusion of a deliberative
process.
Is willing to inquire, and critique
previous stances, choices, and
actions with natural openness to
reframe and modify them in any
way/direction
10. Is focused on achieving the goals
and foci and outcomes of a
deliberative process; believes that,
when it comes to happiness,
achieving one’s goal is what one
should seek
Believes that, when it comes to
valuing the achievement of
happiness, the process is more
important than the destination
A. Piagetian and post-Piagetian cognitive development
psychologies share a common heritage with Pol and Ville (2009)
unilinear stage theory of cognitive development (Flavell, 1963).
It “borrows” a structural genetic epistemology marked by a
universal assumption of growth in cognitive terms influencing
overall human growth. It is assumed that cognitive meaning
making in the inner self drives stances to life and action. Indeed,
in all of the Piagetian and post-Piagetian stage models, cognitive
moral maturity is seen as associated with a dualistic hypothesis,
whereby initially an autonomous (AS) and subsequently a
processual (PS) kind of cognitive meaning making underlies two
opposing modes of human maturity. For example, two key works
that are consistent are:
B. Kegan. The post-Piagetian theories of cognitive
development, proposed by Kegan (1994) and (Lahey Laskow,
1986), adopt a subject–object relation psychoanalysis oriented in
answering the question how to best deal with all mental demands
of life, and here relations are also understood as one of these.
These theories trace qualitative changes in how people make
meaning from experience in the cognitive affective, interpersonal,
and intrapersonal domains, with an emphasis on the cognitive
rationalism domain, despite its multi-dimensionality (Creamer
et al., 2010, p. 550 and 552). These stage models describe
a subjective framework in which a person is embedded
that operates in the “assessment” of an object (which refers to a
person, an act, or a situation in these works). Its basic assumption
is that the entire latter (weaker in cognitive terms) way of
understanding becomes the “object” that is critically evaluated
by higher frames of mind (cognitive domains). Each person’s
mind is thus seen as capable of developmental shifts in meaning
making structures and qualities until a shift reaches a newmental
equilibrium (Kegan, 1994). For this author (Kegan, 1986)4 and
related feminist-inspired versions (Lahey Laskow, 1986), PS
emerges at the end and previous assumptions in line with an
idealized AS mode of the self and human integrity are rejected.
The challenge of PS is found in how to respond to the
transcendence of one’s “mind”—how to adaptively and reflexively
respond without relying on rationalist judgment on the basis of
positions, principles, and ideologies as seen in the previous stage
of AS. Hence, PS here emphasizes a valuation that chooses a
dynamic Hegelian type dialectic.
C. Cook Greuter. Another seminal post-Piagetian piece
of literature in this genre comes from Cook-Greuter (1999)
extension of Loevinger’s (1966), Loevinger (1976) theory. For this
author (Cook-Greuter, 1999), PS emerges at the end, rejecting
previous assumptions in line with an idealizedASmode of the self
and human integrity. Human development toward integrity and
maturity in the self in Cook-Greuter (1999) is seen not just as a
cognitive challenge. It is rather mainly understood as a challenge
of ego; hence, Freudian ego development is the basic underlying
4Kegan introduces ASmeaningmaking in “the self-authoringmind” stage (“fourth
order, or modern mind”) (1994). He illustrates that the AS autonomously defines
one’s value system(s), identities, goals, and destiny using critical reason, while
it enables the subject-author to independently “author” personal moral choices,
actions, and decisions that are detached from feelings as the particulars of
each relationship are approached with skepticism (Kegan, 1994). Kegan’s model
introduces PS as the highest post-autonomous stage, using the labels “the self-
transforming mind” (Kegan’s fifth order, or post-modern mind). Processually, the
latter operates dialectically in a direct fashion (Kegan, 1994).
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TABLE 2 | Constructivist cognitive moral developmental theory.
Autonomous Self (AS) = Modern Autonomous Processual self (PS)= Post Modern Autonomous
Kohlberg Stage 5—Prior rights and social contract or Utility: Stage 7 (In Kohlberg, Stage 7 is acknowledged as a duality
compared to Stages 5–6, i.e., a second pole of moral maturity, for
persons to acknowledge and practice both AS and PS)
It is right to uphold a society’s basic rights, values and legal contracts,
even when they conflict with concrete rules and laws of the group
Answering the question “Why be moral? Why be just in a universe that
appears unjust?” with a self-directed commitment to ethics as a way of life
Laws and duties are based on rational calculation of overall utility (“the
greatest good for the greatest number”)
Natural law theory holding that individual responsibilities, duties and rights
are not arbitrary, or dependent on social convention but are objectively
grounded as laws of nature
Stage 6—Universal Ethical Principles: Experience is of a non-egoistic or non-dualistic variety. The essence of this
experience is a sense of being part of the whole of life. Experience of ethics
in the process of life, as a whole
Assumes guidance by universal ethical principles: justice, equality of
human rights…
Taking a cosmic perspective that begin with the realization of the finitude of
our individual self: ethics as a feature in interdependent moral inquiry
When law violates the principle, one acts in accordance with the principle
The perspective corresponds to a rational individual recognizing the basic
moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, not means
Kegan 4th Order: Self—Authorship: Self-Formation, Identity,
Autonomy/Individuation:
5th Order: Self—Transcending Mind, Interpenetration of Self and Other,
Relationship between forms.
Good working of the self and its recognition by the other begins with the
shared premise that each brings a distinct and whole self to the relationship
Capacity for a new trans-system or cross-form way of organizing reality.
Refuses to see oneself or the other as a single system or form. Taking
relationships as a process that itself creates its form or elements. The
relationship is a context for sharing and interacting in which both parties
experience their multipleness
The relationship is a context for the sharing and interacting of two whole,
distinct, self-possessed and self-authoring selves (p. 312)
In the face of difference (5th-order selves), stops to see if they haven’t in fact
made the error of identifying themselves wholly with a foreign culture of
mind that gives rise to their position (which shows up as a kind of ideology
or orthodoxy) and identifying their partner wholly with a foreign culture of
mind that gives rise to their partner’s position
People consider themselves at their best; when in the face of difference,
they do not disdain the other, but seek to discover how the other’s point of
view arises out of a “culture of a mind” with its own coherence and integrity
Loevinger and
Cook Greuter
Individualistic Stage (E7) Integrated Stage (E9)
Beginning to attend to context and point of view Construct Aware—
Recognizes fundamental ego-centricity as an obstacle to growth. Being a
witness to oneself as an experiencing being. Concepts of self and world are
subjective and continually changing. Humility and deep tolerance for others.
Cyclical systems view of causality
Understanding assumptions behind conventional stages Unitive—
Immersed in immediate flow of ongoing experience. Views others from
multiple points of view. Tolerant, compassionate and feel an affinity with all
life. Dual knowing, accessing reality directly and through symbols
Reality is not “out there,” but connected to personal interpretation
Truth is relative
Multiple sometimes contradictory selves
Autonomous Stage (E8)
Integration of conflicting sub-identities
Self-determination, self-actualization, and self-definition
Believe they have realistic view of self and world
theory, evolving via nine stages—three of which come at the
post-conventional level and are relevant to this article5.
5The first is the “Individualistic/Autonomous” stage, which captures AS. Here,
the person masters his ego via critical reason and it is Cook-Greuter who herself
criticizes the overly analytic use of reason whereby moral disagreement (often
without conscious processing) is approached “. . . as a mere technical problem
to be solved” (1999: 24). Instead, the seminal theory which predates this modes
is Loevinger (1966). This captures PS via the “integrated stage” (1976); in Cook-
Greuter (1999) model— that she arrived to upon empirical testing of Loevinger’s
stage— PS is “broken down” in two integrated stages: the Construct Aware and
the Unity “Integrated Stages.” Here, PS requires the dissolution of the notion
of self altogether as a meaningless conception that is dominated by the ego
(Cook-Greuter, 1999).
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D. Kohlberg. Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory
critically displays the interplay between AS and PS and
particularly focuses on how intellectual capacities affect the
quality and kind of moral meaning making, so it is a theory with
a special concern for the moral action as a domain6. It is not
initially clear for academic reviewers if Kohlberg goes from AS
to PS via a “rejection” of AS (AS is aligned with Kohlberg’s theory
premises) or if he finally proposes that a dualistic way supporting
a synthesis between AS and PS is possible (which would mean
a non-rejection of AS in agreement with Kohlberg, 1969; Colby
and Kohlberg, 1987). We suggest that he has a rather dualist
proposal (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972): his earlier body of work
looked at the cognitive moral maturity of AS (Kohlberg, 1969,
1981; Colby and Kohlberg, 1987), while his later works attempted
to lay a foundation for an alternative processual “mode” of
human maturity or PS (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Kohlberg
and Ryncarz, 1990)7. Kohlberg’s work helps us to uncover and
theoretically describe the differences and interplay between AS
and PS (Kohlberg andMayer, 1972). But even these authors’ latest
revised theories do not help transcend AS and PS’s conflict or
being understood as a dualism.
E. Ryan and Deci. Considered the key modern psychology
scholars in the tradition of mainstream psychological theory
(Ryan and Lynch, 1989; Deci and Ryan, 1991, 2013; Ryan, 1995;
Ryan andDeci, 2000, 2004), their theories echo similar grounding
assumptions on a universal model of self and cognitive integrative
dynamics. Like in all stage theories, these works also purport
that self-integration is an aspirational ideal. This understands
human maturity as a goal that can be globally achieved and
“mastered” via more mature states (not stages, in this case) of
human development. The main theoretical premise therein seeks
to uncover what promotes motivational integrative dynamics
in the self (Deci and Ryan, 1991). Hence, there are many
commonalities between these theoretical assumptions and the
modes of AS-PS in the stage-based adult development theories
included8. The focus here is psychological dynamics that activate
6Until his sixth stage of moral development, Kohlberg closely follows Piagetian
scientific rationality epistemology (for which he is often misunderstood as a
quintessential Piagetian thinker despite the evolution of his work near the end of
his life). Kohlberg’s (1969), Kohlberg (1981) stages 5-6 clearly conceptualize the
cognitive processing of AS, which is expressed via an idealistic introduction of an
autonomous and principled will that displays a concern for universal standards
of justice and fairness— fifth Cognitive Moral Development stage— followed by
an autonomous rational definition of personal values in consistency with justice,
human dignity and human rights, sixth CMD stage (Kohlberg, 1984; Colby and
Kohlberg, 1987).
7Within cognitive moral development models, it is Kohlberg’s seventh stage
(Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972; Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 1990) that “turns its back”
on all previous epistemological assumptions of the above models (Akrivou,
2013). Kohlberg seems to have had a breakthrough in his research when he
published -shortly before his suicide- an empiricist, processual kind of moral
psychology. Abandoning rationalism and the idea of detached abstract knowing
(Akrivou, 2013), Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 1990) argues for an organismic,
contextually sensitive, fluid and adaptive response mode in his seventh stage.
Kohlberg acknowledges both “modes” of moral psychology as important for ethics,
but his work does not add any theoretical solution or hypothesis for the possible
reconciliation of AS and PS.
8Ryan is in agreement with Kegan and Cook-Greuter’s understanding of the self as
lacking unity and operating with conflicting premises across various domains (e.g.
in Ryan, 1995). Ryan aims to find how to reach a state of autonomous integrative
inner tendencies, striving to cover various needs and domains
and gradually aiming to establish higher unity in the self (Ryan,
1995). Self-development, in our view, relies upon a dynamic–
synthetic (influenced by a Hegelian synthesis view) system view
of the self-striving toward gradual self-unifying processing and
the achievement of autonomous processing (Ryan, 1995). This is
premised to be possible via two opposing or conflicting modes of
processing, i.e., either via more rationalist-cognitive processing
(relevant to AS, as shown), or via a more emotive and intuitive
mode of processing in the self (relevant to PS, as shown).
THE IPS MINDSET: INTEGRATION OF THE
PERSONALIST, THE MODERN, AND THE
NATURALIST PERSPECTIVES AND A
UNIFIED UNDERSTANDING OF THE
PERSON AND ACTION
Specifically, IPS presents a different paradigm of understanding
the self and action, which influences how action with maturity
is understood. It consists in considering human beings and
human development not in an idealized way, but as they really
are, respectively, abandoning altogether the hypothesis of self-
autonomy as a precondition for self, human action and meaning
making, and moral and cognitive maturity itself.
This model is based on an interdisciplinary dialogue between
philosophy and psychology (Akrivou et al., 2016, 2018). The
key philosophers for understanding this proposal are Aristotle,
Leonardo Polo, Alfred N. Whitehead, and Wang Yangming, as
well as the psychologists Carl Rogers, Erik Erikson, and Viktor
Frankl. The proposal’s basic assumption is the integration of
the personalist, the naturalist, and the modern “mindsets,” so its
theoretical premise foundation starts from Polo’s three radicals
(fundamentals) that describe the different main approaches to
being in the history of thought. The radical (fundamental root)
of nature—based on classical philosophy—states that the human
being has a nature to develop with psychological and biological
dimensions, and that a person is naturally a dependent rational
animal; hence, our reason is chosen by each person based on a
teleological concern (the common good). Secondly, the radical of
the person—based on the Christian philosophy—affirms that the
human being has a singularity due to its intimacy and uniqueness,
and that we can rely on our intimacy to lead action with a
particular kind of freedom, which is “freedom for” affirming
a relational ontological basis for the self and a transcendental
anthropology regarding what is to be human, i.e., that the person
is a unity that pre-exists action and life itself. Thirdly, the radical
of the subject—based on modern philosophy—is focused on
the result or end products of our action; it affirms that the
human being can produce new things instead of developing what
(s)he receives.
IPS captures therefore Polo’s work main assumption as the
philosopher proposes that all these three “radicals” are present in
processing, as well as the key purpose of these theories, which aremainly concerned
with how to effectively perform and cope such that the organism can function with
autonomy (Ryan, 1995).
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each action, integrated by the person. Therefore, human action
is an action that is by constitution integrated but different forms,
qualities, and kinds of integration exist, which are available to us
based on the choices we make and how to relate to others and
act. Applying these to integrative human growth, Akrivou et al.
(2018) suggest that being and growing as a human being involves
the systemic integration of these fundamentals from within a
person as a unity, which means that knowledge and action are
by definition one in the constitution of the self. It also means
that, in this model, the self is understood as a relational self by
its very constitution (which pre-exists even action) and that there
is a unity across cognitive, affective, practical, and ethical aspects
of action.
So, based on this last idea, personalist moral psychology is
very well-harmonized with virtue ethics’ normative philosophy
(Koehn, 1995; Solomon, 1999; Akrivou, 2013). According to these
scholars, (a) personal growth is meaningless outside of the notion
of acting for the common good in the frame of relational inter-
personal growth concerned for the overall growth of specific
others (freedom for) as much as one’s own; in fact, the idea
that growth happens via autonomous individualist action or
capacities is meaningless in the IPS theory. Secondly, according
to this model, (b) human growth is shaped by assumptions
characterizing free and open systems, such that growth can go
in any direction and evolves in processual and responsive moral
dialoguing terms (Akrivou and Orón, 2016).
Integration in IPS needs to happen from within the person:
only by being able to acknowledge everyone as a transcendental
and unique human being with the capacity to be free to love
other human beings (not for logical reasons) is it possible for
our relationships to limitlessly grow. Combining (a) and (b)
leads to the idea that in the IPS model, the personal action
is not chosen neither from within self-interested concerns, nor
from within a duty and obligation as the logic of exchange
but instead it is the logic of gift which is the driver of action
(Akrivou et al., 2018). The authors (Akrivou et al., 2018) also
show that, in fact, the twin model of AS and PS is a dualistic
understanding of the same fundamental root of humanity
because they both capture assumptions with a focus on the
mastery of the outcomes of action (production) in the world
that are part of the subject-agent’s modern “radical.” Thus, the
pathway for human cognitive maturity from within the subject-
agent’s self-system ignores (or weakly respects) the “radical of
the person” and the “radical of nature.” As a consequence,
the pathway for human cognitive maturity is narrower
and unsustainable.
Broader human learning and development theory outside the
key theories of development in modern psychology reviewed
earlier in this article, including the works of Rogers (1951,
1961, 1964) and Erikson (1994), are particularly relevant to
illustrate how action with integrity and moral maturity is
led from within the IPS mindset operates. IPS is concerned
with relations as a gift freely chosen with a concern to help
the entire whole person emerge as opposed to instrumental
relations within a mastery perspective. Indeed, how this helping–
psychotherapeutic relationship works can be understood via the
work of Rogers (1961) who illustrates our argument that IPS
does not present a model of maturity that simply synthesizes, or
technically integrates (Akrivou and Orón, 2016), system 1 and
system 2 cognition. From the very beginning of the therapeutic
accompaniment, Rogers seeks that the client enters into his
interiority and makes a growth path from there. This happens
by gradually trusting in how one’s humanity is manifested via
an experiential path that frees the inner experiencing focus, and a
gradual trust of the immediacy of experience within the person’s
organism to free the integrity we all naturally share as persons
(Rogers, 1961, p. 131).
This reference to inner experiencing process that is only
facilitated through the logic of gift in relations is a journey
to inner virtue and it is precisely here that Rogers shows
that it takes time, and one has to live and reflect on various
experiences and feelings. IPS agrees with Rogers that growth
is only possible through mutual growth in the relationship
(Akrivou and Orón, 2016), but Rogers’ humanistic relational
psychoanalysis provides the IPS a useful theoretical pathway
toward turning “modern autonomous selves” into the IPS
mindset when a human personal relationship is deprived of
the secure distanced approach of the Cartesian observer and
ceases to master the other while maintaining cognitive control
and mastery.
To illustrate, Rogers (in stage six) purports that the journey
toward higher IPS maturity requires the experiential learning
that also includes the capacity for acceptance of “both a
feeling and what constitutes its content” (1964, p. 146–8),
which involves the entire abstract and emotional–intuitive
cognition of a person without censoring this from outside-
in, but while utilizing human relationships as the basis
of personal growth. At stage seven of Rogers’s framework
(Rogers, 1951, 1961; Rogers and Dymond, 1954; Gendlin,
1962, 1969, 1978), personal growth is completed by accepting
one’s own contradictions and full humanity with “a growing
sense of ownership of the changing feelings (bringing about),
a basic trust in one’s own inward . . . total organismic
process” (Rogers, 1961, p. 151).
SUMMARY ON THE
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL DEBATE ON
LIGHT OF AS-PS, AND THE IPS MINDSETS
We think that the whole discussion about AS/PS models and
their evolution correspond naturally with Kahneman’s exposition
of the two systems. However, we observe a great evolution in
current neuroscience that—besides their differences—surpasses
the division of Kahneman’s system 1 and system 2 thanks to
a more dynamic and systemic conception of the brain. Based
on that, we will present another way to understand human
development according to the IPS paradigm.
Systematic review of the broad and fragmented theory and
literature on dual processing models of higher (social) cognition
(Evans, 2008) helps to ground AS and PS’s distinct cognitive
mechanisms. Current accounts of dual-processing support the
idea of two distinct cognitive autonomous processing systems
that are distinct in both evolutionary terms (looking to the history
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of the development of the human mind) and the architecture of
cognition (Evans, 2008)9.
Evans (2008) suggests that evidence explicitly associates
system 1 cognition with emotion and is capable of utilizing
rationalist cognition as secondary (Evans, 2008, p. 258). We
believe this indeed supports our argument that PS primarily
relies on synthesis of system 1 and 2 that allows to be not just
rationalistic but also more dynamic, while reason is utilized as a
follow-up cognitive mechanism. Research in psychology suggests
that there is also a self-protective “bias” here, as reason is required
to offer post-hoc rationalization of what is primarily an emotive
and intuitive subjective action (Haidt, 2001). This would confirm
that, although it ismore relational, PS remains focused on the self.
We will now focus on current neuroscience evolution. The
proposed systems 1 and 2 are inserted into the line of modular
vision of the brain. Modular vision, in its strictest version,
associates each brain module with a cognitive function. The
main reference of the defense of modular thought is the
philosopher of the mind Fodor (1983). Although his statements
are currently subject to nuances, his proposal has received
continuity from both philosophers of the mind and scientists,
and they are applied in many fields, such as Gardner’s multiple
intelligence (1998) and emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1998,
2008; Rolls, 2014). However, this neuroscientific vision has been
seriously questioned, and other models of understanding the
brain functioning are being explored.
A neuroscientific analysis exceeds the claims of this article,
where we just show this current debate. The first criticisms
against the systemic approach that opt for a dynamic vision
that requires synchronizations of the whole brain, but also
considering external relations to the person, will come from
the “dynamic systems” proposals (Thelen and Smith, 1994;
Kelso, 1995; Juarrero, 2002). We can consider the works of
Pessoa (2008, 2013), Anderson (2014, 2016), and Sporns (2011,
2014), Shine et al. (2019) as a point of inflection since they
9The same idea, although in narrower, more specialized terms, has been published
in other influential works in psychology, namely the idea that there are two
opposing kinds of social cognition i.e., Kahnemann’s fast and slow brain (2011;
Kahneman and Riis, 2005) and the premise of an antagonistic conflicting
relationship between analytical reasoning (corresponding to AS) and socio-
emotional cognition (corresponding to PS) in the opposing domains theory from
Jack et al. (2012). These works show differences associated with dual systems
of thinking as follows: The first cluster focuses on consciousness, where system
1 is less conscious, implicit, automatic and holistic (perceptual), while system
2 is conscious, explicit, highly controlled, and analytic (thinks/reflects) (Evans,
2008). The second cluster distinguishes systems 1 and 2 in evolutionary terms,
where system 1 is old in evolutionary terms, with a focus on an evolutionary
kind of rationality that is shared between animals and humans and that is more
holistic/non-verbal. System 2 is evolutionarily more recent, with a focus on
individual, autonomous reasoning processing; it is uniquely human and mainly
linked to language. The third cluster is based on the assessment of the two systems
on the basis of their functional characteristics, where system 1 is associative,
domain specific, contextualized and more pragmatic; system 2 is rule based,
domain general, universal, abstract, non-contextualized and sequential. Finally, the
fourth cluster of classifications of prior studies on system 1 and 2’s distinctions is
based on individual differences. According to this focus, system 1 is independent
of general intelligence and working memory and is thus more shared/universal
across the human species, whereas system 2 is highly dependent on a person’s
general intelligence and limited by one’s working memory capacities and thus is
less universal and more particular.
disqualify the claim that a brain module can be associated with
a psychological function (for a detailed account of the evolution
of neuroscience, see Blanco, 2014, and Orón Semper, 2019 in
the field of emotion). From neuroscience, the debate is open
but what seems more accurate in the understanding of emotion
is that it is an information of the global estate of the system
and, in the case of human being, an effect of human action
and his or her history (Orón Semper, 2019, p. 299). Different
ways of understanding brain functioning leads to different
understandings of human reality as well as different educational
proposals (Orón et al., 2016).
This new vision of neuroscience is congruent with the main
assumptions of the IPS proposal: that relationship is constitutive
of the persons but each person’s singularity is a complicated
process of how each person acts as a unity of virtue to grow with
the other(s) one chooses to offer gifts to (freedom for), albeit
relating as a free and open system. Affective processes in the self
and other relations are informed by each person’s unique identity
and history, while a two-way feedback processing informs the
neuroscience of IPS mindset. There is also a clear vision of the
organism as a system that does not allow one part of the brain
to act independently of the others, but rather it is a unified
orientation in only one direction. This would be related to the
IPS conception of human action, as a unifying movement that
arises from within the person and aims to act with/for others
albeit in ways which provides to the acting person opportunities
to integrate and improve their life according to who they are and
their calling. So, action is always both personal and social at the
same time in IPS and is not marked by the duality between self-
interest versus duty to others’s good but seeks mutual virtuous
growth via personal relational action. In IPS, growth happens
this way, while the motivation for growth is for each person the
striving to intensify and improve the quality of relation to the
others involved in an action.
IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION
According to our research on the self and action (Akrivou
and Orón, 2016; Akrivou et al., 2018), each “mindset” offers
a different assumption and vision on how to understand and
lead educational relations and networks to positively influence
learning and growth involving wider forms of community.
Regarding the existing antagonistic functioning between AS
and PS in the self-autonomy paradigm of human growth, PS
does not abandon AS because PS keeps the cognitive approach
to education, which is supporting a system/module mentality
(in cognition and forms of action undertaken in education)
and is always concerned with a choice between educational
approaches that serve either the cognitivist or the more active-
responsive-emotivist two systems (constantly falling into a
dualistic fallacy)10.
10Specifically, in AS, system 2 (slow) has to take control of system 1 (fast), while
in PS, the subject-agent needs the (higher capacity of) synthesis to maintain a
“flow” behavior. But, this is not always as simply done as is idealized, as Kohlberg
shows, knowing that reason in system 2 is quite dominant. Hence, the highest
stages in stage theory need to idealize a final stage whereby only then a technical
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IPS theory is not an alternative view on how to balance or
integrate systems 1 or 2. IPS implies a new hypothesis of human
cognitive processing by suggesting that there are no modes and
no modular view of the brain; indeed, from a neuroscientific
perspective, IPS is not concerned with the technical integration
between two modes. IPS altogether transcends/abandons the
mentality/hypothesis of autonomous system functions in the
brain and a different notion of the human being emerges.
For this reason, IPS is not a proposal/model of how to
technically integrate system 1 and system 2. Good examples
of published educational work that seem more consistent with
IPS is the first published cases of educational program that
developed relations and networks of exchange within their
wider community as a distinct strategy for social innovation by
Grogan and Fahrenwald (2019, in Weber et al., 2019). Indeed,
the development and nurturing of human and communal level
relations and networks in these examples have multiplied effects
of positive social virtuous growth and influence through the
very action of students and teachers, which seems closer to the
IPS model.
Naturally, as a theory of human beings and action, it claims
to transcend the dualism of AS-PS that relies on the autonomous
self-subject’s agency by bringing back the person as the systemic
integrator of the two modes (rationalist or affective or intuitive
faculties). The question is not if reason guides (mature) human
action (with integrity) or if moral feelings and intuitions are
better premises. We suggest instead that it is the person who
acts, which is supported by our altogether different interpretation
of the human brain and its cognitive architecture. In general
terms, we state that while AS is aligned with an education based
on rational and memoristic exercise, and PS is aligned with
the proposal of education in competencies that dominate today,
IPS is asking for a change of paradigm that put interpersonal
relationships and personal growth in the center. Both PS and
IPS consider relationships, but while for PS relationships have
an instrumental value, for IPS, they have a final value, or value
in themselves. The instrumental view of relationships can be
found in some proposals (Hughes and Cavell, 1999; Frymier and
Houser, 2000) that study the effect of the interaction between the
teacher and the student, as well as motivation and learning in the
school environment.
This debate is not new, for instance, the UNESCO report
“Learning: The treasure within” (Delors et al., 1996) shows that
the four pillars of education (including learning to do, learning
to be, learning to live together, and learning to know) must be
unified to the service of “learning to live together,” which places
interpersonal relationships as an end and not as a mere means.
A similar discussion is found in Peters (1966, p. 34, 1967) who
warns not to be confused between an educated student and a
trained student, and that the school should seek for educated
integration (“synthesis”) happens. This is an idealized notion of human growth. It
is not possible to say that PS is system 1 because it implies one involution. System 1
is present in animals and humans and system 2 proper to human beings. As shown
earlier, if in PS human beings learn to abandon system 2 to focus on system 1, then
this implies an involution in development.
people (for amore detailed study of this debate, see Orón Semper,
2018, and Orón Semper and Blasco, 2018).
This open debate helps us to enter the educational discussion
about the different ways of understanding cognition according
to the different models, but now we will just give some
suggestions to reflection at the educational level. For AS,
cognition is a psychological act reduced to a mere rationalistic
exercise and whose activity is fundamentally theoretical. Personal
relationships are almost accessory to the act of learning, because
in the end, the main student’s relationship is with the book.
For PS, cognition is still a psychological act whose activity
would be theoretical and practical. Cognition remains an
eminently rationalist act but is enriched by other psychological
faculties such as will and emotion that are added. These other
psychological acts as well as personal relationships have an
instrumental value for the person to control their surroundings
thanks to the acquisition of some skills.
For IPS, cognition as a psychological act is initiated from the
interiority of the person as a way to interact and position herself
in the world. That psychological cognition is activated from
the person’s interiority means that when the person expresses
herself from within, the various psychological faculties are
born integrated. The person’s end is not properly to dominate
the object that seeks to know, but rather the interpersonal
relationship, an encounter with another person. While PS
instrumentalizes the relationship to reach the object, IPS
instrumentalizes the object to reach the person as an end. In both
cases, the object is mastered and the relationships are present, but
in a very different way. Another difference between PS and IPS
is the role of the educator. For PS, the educator is a coach, who
facilitates or helps the student to attain her goals, which does not
imply that the educator as such has to change, and the process
rests fundamentally in the learner’s action. For IPS, the educator
is, in some way, being also educated, because he or she also has to
grow. The action is fundamentally a cooperative action and not a
sum of individual actions. We think that nowadays the sensitivity
toward the IPS model and its educational involvement through
pedagogical proposals is growing, as can be seen, for instance, in
the new trend of “service learning.”
Having clarified the anthropological and psychological
assumptions for AS, PS and IPS, and seen how these involve
two different educational and relational models, its application
to innovation appears as very suggestive. AS and PS grow as
they manage to expand their mastery and control, domain after
domain, understanding innovation as a key to adaptation and
efficiency. According to these models, any change that helps the
best realization of the person’s purpose (that is, any improvement
in efficiency) will be considered an innovation. In the IPS model,
innovation acquires broader perspectives: the object is at the
service of the interpersonal encounter. This change proposes an
education centered neither on the object (AS) nor on the subject
(PS), but focused on the relationship (IPS) (Orón Semper, 2018).
Innovation in the IPS is also associated with the growth of
the subject, but as the subject is understood differently, the sense
of growth also changes. If personal growth is unrestricted (Polo,
1997, 2007a,b), the human being attempts to transform the world
as an opportunity for growth. Our biggest project is the one
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we develop with regard to ourselves and our processes of self-
determination. This means that anthropology and motivation
are intrinsically linked because the main motivation for action
corresponds to becoming more aware of and enjoying one’s
growth, rather than extrinsically seeking to grow one’s financial
or career prospects. Moreover, as various authors have shown
(Ariely et al., 2009), when a task includes a cognitive skill, greater
economic reward leads to poorer performance and less creativity.
Thus, innovation is not merely determined by environmental
stimuli, but rather rests on the fact that the human being—in light
of freedom—is always capable of introducing novelty.
Human growth for IPS is the intensification or maximization
of the interpersonal constituent relationships. Innovation will
be associated with any creative act that manages to improve
the relationship in the real world in which this relationship
takes place. In the case of the human being, adaptation,
efficiency, and even competence do not justify by themselves,
but rather they are at the service of a life of quality, that
is, a life that allows us to live better together. In the best
case, adaptation, efficiency, and competence will be means,
along with many others, to serve a purpose. As Delors himself
indicated, lighting a warning light on the development of
competencies (Delors, 1996, p. 14, 16–18), separated from
their purpose, they can become even degraders of humanity.
In this case, “How can I transform the world around me to
improve interpersonal relationships?” should be the question that
precedes innovation.
In IPS, there is a richer environment than those already
mentioned: the relationship itself. The interpersonal relationship,
being an end, can also be a medium. An interpersonal encounter
is the medium in which innovation best emerges. An example
of this is Lipman’s proposal (Lipman et al., 2002) to make
“research communities” that values interpersonal encounter as
the best means for innovation and thought creation. We think
that this can be developed in pedagogical proposals such as
“cooperative work” and “service-learning,” which does not rule
out the possible goodness of other proposals—such as “learning
through problems” among others—but warns us to put them in
a proper anthropological context. Indeed, within the context of
practical teacher education nowadays, cooperative work, one of
the main inter-organizational learning challenges (Boer et al.,
2018), fits perfectly with IPS mindset because in both cases
personal growth happens thanks to the personal encounter.
The IPS model can help immensely when applied to different
aspects of education. For example, it understands leadership in
education not as successfully applying strategies but as knowing
how to make sense of education and promote cooperation
among colleagues (Simkins, 2005) and students (Orón Semper
and Blasco, 2018). On the whole, when applied to education,
we believe that the IPS model can aid social innovation in a
profound and sustainable way since it shifts education toward an
act focused on social renewal starting with its very foundation.
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